Hlere is a start at l1nking the literatures on taroetino anzd on illtraho0l.lehold IneIualiy lsZ V h iih hav e developed fpidlv hutll largely independent of each other.
largely independent of each other. Akerlof (1979) , and has concerned itself with the design of tax and transfer programs for poverty alleviation in the presence of limited information on who the poor are. The origins of the literature on intrahousehold inequality are referred to in Sen (1984) . This literature arose out of a dissatisfaction with "unitary" models of the household, especially in explaining observed inequality in consumption and achievements of different household members, even after making an allowance for relevant differences among them.
While the two academic literatures have indeed been mostly innocent of each other, the significance of intrahousehold inequality and allocation for targeting has not escaped the notice of policymakers. In developed countries, the debate on whether child benefit should be paid to the mother at a welfare office, or to the father's paycheck through a tax exemption, has essentially been about the perceived allocation, and reallocation, of intrahousehold resources. Similarly, the discussion in developing countries about knock on effects of supplementary feeding programs for children, and for pregnant and lactating women, is essentially one about whether or not extra calories at the feeding station means fewer calories received by the individual at home. concludes with a list of topics for further research.
INTRAHOUSEHOLD ALLOCATION AND INEQUALITY
Are similar individuals treated dissimilarly in the allocation of consumption within a household? The answer from the empirical literature is that this possibility has to be taken seriously. Sen (1984) summarizes a number of studies on outcome variables which argue that girls within households are discriminated relative to boys. Harriss (1986) presents at least some evidence of calorie intake inequality. Haddad and Kanbur (1990a) shew that standard measures of inequality in calorie adequacy would be understated by 30 to 40 percent if intrahousehold inequality was ignored.
But is the above sufficient evidence that similar individuals are being treated dissimilarly? If individuals differ in their produdltiviiies, Lieri exArd caiories may weili De callea tor as an income generation device for the household as a whole (Pitt, Rosenzweig, and Hassan 1990) . Even a household that was egalitarian in terms of its welfare functicn might allocate calories unequally.
While there are some tests of the degree of inequality aversion displayed by a household welfare function, as revealed by consumption allocation and other outcomes (Behrman and Deolalikar 1989) , a major debate in the literature is on whether such a "common preference" model is valid. An alternative is a view of the outcomes as being determined by intrahousehold bargaining. The empirical implications of this for demand theory are laid out by McElroy (1990) , who makes clear that the difference between the common preference and bargaining approaches can be traced to the fact that, in the latter, changes in the external environment can alter the "threat points" and lead to reallocations that are different from those predicted by the household wel-are maximizing model. Haddad and Kanbur (1990b) have considered the predictions of the bargaining model on intrahousehold inequality as the household gets better ott. they find that the net effect depends on a subtle interaction between changes in the gains from cooperation and in the threat points. Under certain conditions, intrahousehold inequality can first increase and then decrease, thus tracing out a "Kuznets curve." Haddad and Kanbur (1990c) find empirical evidence for such a relationship for data from the Philippines. Thomas (1990) and Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotlikoff (1990) are among the authors who find evidence that is not supportive of the common preference model. As we shall see, this finding is of some significance for targeting of poverty alleviation programs.
THE PRINCIPLES OF TARGETING
Besley and Kanbur (1988) have considered the principles of targeting that underlie the literature emanating from Akerlof (1978) .
The theory of targeting concerns itself with the design of transfer mechanisms for alleviating poverty. Given a pre-intervention distribution of income and a poverty line, an ideal solution nmight be characterized as being one where sufficient income is transferred to the poor to bring them just up to the poverty line. There are, however, at least two problems with the ideal solution. First, since transfers fall one-to-one with income, it entails an effective marginal tax rate on the poor of 100 percent. This is bound to have incentive effects -Kanbur, Keen, and Tuomala (1991) give a quantitative feel for the consequences. Second, it requires that the policymaker has quite detailed information on individuals, making it possible to exclude those above the poverty line, and to ta,lor the magnitude of the transfer quite finely to those below the poverty line. Such detailed information, and the administrative ability to use it, is simply not present in most developing countries, and, in certain contexts, in developed countries as well.
In view of this second problem, Besley and Kanbur (1988) characterize two types of targeting mechanisms-indicator targeting apd self-targeting. Indicator targeting relies on making the transfer contingent not on income or consumption, but some easily observable characteristic, such as sex, age, landholding, region of residence, etc. Akerlof (1978) referred to this as "tagging." As he shows, this extra information is bound to be useful. Kanbur (1987) and Kanbur and Keen (1989) derive optimal rules for contingent transfers, while Ravallion (1989) quantifies the gain from using this information.
Haddad and Kanbur (1991a) develop the theory of "upper-limit indicator targeting," where an upper cutoff of an observable variable, such as age, is used to determine eligibility in transfer programs (e.g., supplementary feeding).
Self-targeting mechanisms rely on an announced scheme that permits unlimited participation, but is designed in such a way that only members of the target group find it worthwhile to participate.
Thus, costly administrative screening and verification of indicators, etc., is not necessary-the incentives to participate are themselves the screen. Such "self-screening" or "self-selection" has been analyzed in the recent theoretical literature on imperfect information (e.g., Hoff and Stiglitz 1990) , but the mechanisms themselves were well known, for example, to those who designed the Indian famine codes in the 19th century (Dr6ze 1988).
The basic idea is to impose a cost of participation that varies directly with pre-intervention income. The best known illustration of such a scheme is the Employment Guarantee Scheme (EGS) in tne state of Maharashtra in India (Ravallion 1991 
SELF-TARGETING MECHANISMS AND INTRAHOUSEHOLD BARGAINING
Haddad and Kanbur (1990b) present a simple model of intrahousehold bargaining whose object is to relite the gains from cooopration, and the outside options, to agricultural production possibilities. In that model, there are two individuals, each with access to a production function that produces output as the result of two task inputs. There is comparative advantage in the tasks, so it pays to cooperate and specialize in tasks. But how are the gains from cooperation to be divided? Suppose that the fallback option for each individual is identified with the outcome of working alone. The individua. with absolute advantage thus has a better fallback option and, if we interpret this as a threat point of a Nash bargain, he will get the higher share of the cooperative output. There is, therefore, intrahousehold inequality. Haddad and Kanbur (1990b,c) then an increase in W will increase x 2 and decrease x 1 , even though the guarantee is not taken ug. As W increases to S,, both threat pu;iiLb tLeI.uUi e qu!' a-,u tihere is perfect equaiity. ror w > 4x, bOth individuals will move to the guarantee scheme. What is remarkable is that, even before this point, the scheme has a long reach-it equalizes intrahousehold allocation by altering outside options.
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Of course, the credibility of the guarantee is at the heart of the matter, and this brings the issue back to some of the policy debates on employment rationing of employment guarantee schemes (Ravallion 1990) . With rationing, the guarantee is not credible, and will not have its full effect on intrahousehold allocation. The analysis of interactions between intrahousehold allocation and selftargeting schemes thus stands cut as a potentiallh fruitful topic for theoretical and empirical research. A start is made in this direction in Haddad and Kanbur (1991b) .
FURTHER RESEARCH
We hope that the juxtaposition of the two literatures that is attempted here will serve to increase the interaction between them.
Such cross-fertilization has already begun, but a host of interesting theoretical, empirical, and policy questions suggest themselves. In particular, what is the quantitative significance of the "long reach" of guarantee and self-targeting mechanisms, through their effect on bargaining threat points, even when no household member actually participates in the scheme? 
